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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Analysis of the Newly Amended Commercial Code
of Japan
by Mark Edward Foster*
I. INTRODUCTION
T he most far-reaching and extensive revisions ever made to the Japa-
nese Commercial Code went into effect on October 1, 1982.1 The revi-
sions, which are the culmination of a decade of legislative study and de-
bate, have produced extensive amendments to the key sections of the
Commercial Code-the sections on Corporate Shares, Shareholders, Di-
rectors, Accounting and Auditing. This is the so-called "Company Law"
of Japan.
A number of factors contributed to the Japanese lawmakers' recogni-
tion of the need to amend the Commercial Code. As originally adopted in
1899 the Code was patterned after the German model 2 and, while having
undergone several piecemeal amendments, had not been thoroughly re-
vised despite significant developments in the Japanese economy. Conse-
quently, it became necessary to update certain provisions of the Commer-
cial Code, e.g., the par value of shares, in light of modern commercial
reality. As will be discussed, the new Code's greatest impact is twofold. It
increases the rights of shareholders both by the express grant of new pow-
* Associate, Braun Moriya Hoashi and Kubota (Tokyo); J.D., Hastings School of Law
(1980); M.A., University of California, Berkeley (1972); B.A., Alma College (1970).
1 Stll No ICHmU Kmsm SuRu l-msu (Law to Amend Portions of the Commercial
Code), Law No.74 of 1981 [hereinafter cited as Law No. 74, or the Amendments]. Law No.
74 is basically comprised of two main parts. The first part contains extensive amendments
to the Commercial Code and the second amends the "Law Regarding Special Exceptions to
the Commercial Code." There is also a shorter section, entitled "Supplementary Provi-
sions", which prescribes transitional measures to be employed and deals with the issue of
retroactivity of the Amendments. The principal section of the Commercial Code affected by
the Amendments is Book 2 "Kaisha" (Corporation) which is the subject of this article.
2 Y. NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANES E LAw 53 (A. Angelo trans. 1976); see also BALLON,
TOMiTA, & Us m, FINANCIAL REPORTING i JAPAN 6 (1976).
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ers and by limiting the powers of the directors, and it requires a signifi-
cant increase in the scope of disclosure of corporate business, finance and
accounting matters. By comparing the pre-amendment and new Code
provisions, the significance of the new provisions can be effectively
summarized.
II. AMENDMENTS TO THE LAWS CONCERNING SHARES
A. Minimum Par Value and "Share Unit System" (Tan-i-Kabu)
Established
Perhaps the most innovative and at the same time potentially troub-
lesome provision of the Commercial Code Amendments is the establish-
ment of a minimum amount of 50,000 yen (U.S. $200)3 for each share
purchase transaction. This is accomplished in several ways under the new
Code. First, for new companies established after October 1, 1982 and issu-
ing par value shares, the minimum par value at the time of incorporation
cannot be less than 50,000 yen.4 For shares without par value5 issued by
newly incorporated companies, the issuing price at the time of incorpora-
tion cannot be less than 50,000 yen.'
For companies already established prior to the effective date of the
amendments, a new system of "share unit" (tan-i-kabu) is established.7
The share unit system is mandatory for companies listed on the stock
exchange and traded publicly, and requires the minimum amount for any
single share transaction to be 50,000 yen. For instance, where the present
par value of the stock is 50 yen (as is commonly the case), the minimum
number of shares which must now be purchased is 1000, and 1000 shares
would therefore constitute one "share unit." While the new Code does not
require that existing companies consolidate their shares to reflect a 50,000
yen per share valuation, provisions for share consolidation do exist. In
fact, the new Code seems to contain a rather strong incentive to
consolidate.8
The result of these provisions is quite drastic, especially considerinj
that the common par value of pre-amendment shares is 50 yen9 as com-
pared to the new requirement of a 50,000 yen minimum.10 While a thou-
3 For purposes herein, an exchange rate of 250 yen to U.S. $1 will be used for reference,
although obviously the rate is subject to fluctuation.
4 Law No. 74, supra note 1, at art. 166.2.
1 Both par value and no par value shares are authorized. Law No. 74, supra note 1, at
art. 166(6).
6 Id. at art. 168-3.
7 Id. at arts. 15-20 (Supp. Provisions, 1981).
8 See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
BALLON, ToMrrA, & Us ,u, supra note 2, at 116-17.
10 Law No. 74, supra note 1, at art. 166.2.
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sand-fold increase in the minimum possible purchase amount may appear
to exclude prospective shareholders, it is actually believed that despite
this requirement, the various other new provisions will cause a resurgence
of middle-income people investing in corporate shares.1' The impact of
the new minimum purchase amount is further diminished by the fact that
even though the par value of a given stock may have previously been only
50 yen, in practice the stock exchanges had already established a mini-
mum of 1000 shares per transaction for such 50 yen par value stock,
thereby already having effectively instituted a 50,000 yen minimum trad-
ing unit.12
Another important reason for the establishment of a unit share sys-
tem is to prevent the disruptive behavior of the notorious sikaiya."s In
the past it had been extremely easy and inexpensive for sukaiya to
purchase the necessary one share of stock to enable them to attend and
vote at general shareholders' meetings. These szkaiya served different
purposes; sometimes they were hired by company management to prevent
minority shareholders from raising controversial issues, or at times one
management faction would hire sukaiya to assist in its efforts to obtain or
maintain dominance in an intra-company factional dispute.", The wide-
spread use of snkaiya has led to shareholders' meetings which were noto-
riously short and unproductive, often conducted in the virtual absence of
democratic procedure or debate.' 5 The 50,000 yen share unit system and
the resultant denial of voting rights to holders of less than one share unit
is one significant step in making it more difficult (or at least more costly)
for the siakaiya to attend and disrupt shareholders' meetings.' 6
The share unit system in the amended Code clearly indicates a desire
to eliminate shareholders who own below the set number of shares re-
quired to constitute one share unit, that is, shareholders owning less than
Mainichi Daily News, Oct. 2, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
12 Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Mar. 2, 1975, at 4, col. 6.
" "Sokaiya" is from the root "sokai," which means shareholders' meeting. S'okaiya
therefore means "person whose business is attending shareholders' meetings."
14 BALLON, TOMITA, & UsAMu, supra note 2, at 190-91.
16 The Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department estimates that approximately 100 billion
yen (U.S. $400 million) was paid to s'okaiya by corporations during 1981. Mainichi Shinbun,
Nov. 4, 1982, at 7, col. 2. However, an ironic twist on the usual function and activities of
s'okaiya occurred in the recent scandal surrounding Mitsukoshi Department Stores and its
long-time President Okada. In that instance, the sokaiya group known as "Rondan
d-oyikai," led by a Mr. Masaki, claimed partial responsibility for exposing the graft and
corruption which led to Okada's resignation and for which he is now standing trial. Shukan
Asahi, Apr. 23, 1982, at 18, col. 6.
1s There are other provisions in the Amendments which are also aimed at preventing
the disruptive s'kaiya. These are the denial of voting rights to shareholders with less than
one unit share, and an express provision prohibiting gratuitous offers of material benefits to
anyone in exchange for exercise of shareholder's rights. Art. 294-2.
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50,000 yen worth of shares. 17 Under the new Code, these odd-lot share-
holders are essentially given two choices: either to keep their shares with-
out having any voting rights (but retaining the right to dividends)"8 or to
demand that the company repurchase the shares at the current market
price. 19 In this respect, the holders of odd-lot shares totalling less than
one share unit are relegated to second class status.'0 Nevertheless, though
the denial of voting rights to holders of odd-lot shares is drastic, no other
realistic solution for implementing the intended share unit system would
seem to exist. Further, since most shareholders in the past have not been
particularly concerned about voting rights, as a practical matter odd-lot
shareholders will probably simply hold onto their shares without voting.
The cost to corporations of processing the documents related to small
holdings, such as distributing annual reports, notice of meetings, etc., also
has been causing considerable concern. By instituting this system, there-
fore, the companies hope to cut back on administrative expense. 2' More-
over, if voting rights were to be retained by odd-lot shareholders, it would
allow s-okaiya who hold less than 50,000 yen worth of shares to continue
to engage in their disruptive practices.
B. Restrictions Established on Corporate Purchase of Stock
In addition to the above changes which primarily affect individual
shareholders, the new Code also introduces several restrictions on the
holding and purchasing of shares by a corporation. First there are restric-
tions relating to the parent-subsidiary corporation relationship. Under
the new Code, a subsidiary corporation may not own shares in its parent
if the parent owns more than 50 percent of the subsidiary's stock.22 In
addition, if a company (Company A), either alone or in combination with
its subsidiary corporation(s), owns more than 25 percent of another com-
pany's stock (Company B), Company B may not exercise voting rights
17 Tan-i miman kabushiki, "odd-lot holders".
'8 Law No. 74, supra note 1, at art. 18. (Supp. Provisions, 1981).
19 Id. at art. 19. (Supp. Provisions, 1981).
20 The treatment of "broken lot" (hakabu) shareholders, who obtain shares as a result
of the issuance of new shares, or after a stock consolidation or split, stands in contrast.
Broken lot shareholders are entitled to register their broken share, Law No. 74, supra note
1, at art. 230-2, and to have a certificate issued, id. at art. 230-3, and to aggregate broken
shares (either by obtaining from someone else another partial share, or as a result of further
stock splits, etc.) until such broken shares constitute a whole share, at which time they
become entitled to exercise all rights of a shareholder, including voting. Id. at arts. 230-4,
230-5, 230-7, 230-8.
21 Journal of the Sangyo Horei Center, Discussion of the Amended Stock Corporation
Law, 2 JAPANEsE Bus. L.J. 313 (1981).
2 Law No. 74, supra note 1, at art. 211-2.
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with respect to any of the stock of Company A which it might own.23
These restrictions are quite novel in terms of expressly restricting, or
at least indicating legislative disapproval towards, mutual and reciprocal
stock holding. In the past, it had not been uncommon for businesses in
Japan to form alliances with other companies for political purposes and
to engage in mutual purchase and holding of large blocks of stock,
thereby allowing directors of one company to expand their influence over
the subsidiary or other company.24 In fact, one estimate reports the
amount of such shareholdings to be 60 to 70 percent of the total traded
on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.25 However, it remains to be seen what the
effect of these proscriptions will be-beyond causing the companies po-
tentially affected to simply reduce their holdings to the 25 percent or
lower point.
While the new Code is more restrictive concerning the parent-subsid-
iary relationship, it is somewhat more permissive with respect to a com-
pany repurchasing or taking in pledge its own issued stock (so-called trea-
sury stock). The pre-amendment Code severely restricted such activity,28
whereas under the amended Code, a company can without limitation re-
acquire up to five percent of its own stock.2 7
C. Stock Splits Facilitated
The new Code also will make stock splits (kabushiki no bunkatsu)
easier to accomplish. Under the pre-amendment Code, stock splitting was
permitted in theory.2 However, since it expressly required that par value
be at least 50 yen29 per share for most presently existing companies, in
practice this placed severe limitations on the number of stock splits be-
cause of the revaluation necessary after any split. This has had a serious
Id. at art. 241(3).
24 KosE TORIHIK IiNKA NENJI HaKOKU SHOWA 49-NENBAN 191 (Fair Trade Commis-
sion Annual Report, 1974).
25 Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Oct. 22, 1982, at 4, col. 4.
26 Former art. 210 allowed a company to repurchase its own shares only if certain ex-
ceptional conditions existed, such as corporate amalgamation. The new Code, Law No. 74,
supra note 1, at art. 210, has retained the previous exceptional conditions, but now also
allows for the free acquisition of shares totalling up to 5% without any of the exceptional
conditions listed therein having to be met.
27 Id. at art. 210.
2' Former art. 293-4, providing for stock splits, has remained intact without alteration
under the new Code.
29 Prior to the implementation of Law No. 74, the Code required that par value, where
designated, be at least 500 yen. This figure was set in the 1951 amendment. However, most
companies of significant standing had been organized prior to then, under the previous 50
yen minimum par value. The relevant standard controlling most companies was therefore 50
yen.
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impact on those companies which have prospered, driving the market
price of their stock beyond the reach of the ordinary investor who has
thus been kept out of the market.30
Under the amended Code, there is no express requirement that a
minimum par value be maintained after incorporation, but only that after
any stock split, the corporation's net assets shall not fall below 50,000 yen
per outstanding share.' Thus, any time the company's financial condition
has become favorable enough to allow for the maintenance of this net
asset to share ratio, a company is now able to effect a stock split, even,
say, of 3:1 if advisable. This is potentially an encouraging sign for inves-
tors and should be another factor stimulating an increase in the number
of individuals turning to the over-the-counter market for investment
purposes.
III. AMENDMENTS CONCERNING THE RULES FOR CONVENING AND
CONDUCTING GENERAL SHAREHOLDERS' MEETINGS
Traditionally, shareholders' meetings in Japan have not been con-
ducted with the same prevailing attitude of discussion and debate that
American and European shareholders have come to expect. Under the
pre-amendment Code, in fact, shareholders were not even entitled to sug-
gest agenda items for upcoming general shareholders' meetings.2 In this
context, the minutes from general shareholders' meetings have often been
contained on two or three pages, reciting perfunctorily those in attend-
ance, the resolutions adopted and adjournment of the meeting. Indeed, as
mentioned, the sukaiya have played an important role in this. Under the
new Code, shareholders' rights are significantly strengthened, and the
conduct of general shareholders' meetings is intended to be somewhat
more democratic.
The Amendment now allows a shareholder who owns either 300 or
more shares or shares amounting to at least one percent of those out-
standing to submit possible agenda items for an upcoming meeting. 3 If
he does so in writing at least six weeks prior to the upcoming meeting, the
directors must upon demand include these proposals in the notice of the
meeting sent to all shareholders.3 4 The previous rule was that a share-
I
30 Journal of the Sangyo Horei Center, supra note 21, at 311.
31 Law No. 74, supra note 1, at arts. 293-4(1), 293-3(2). The same rule prevails for the
consolidation of shares by the corporation for purposes of adjusting the number of shares in
order to make the net assets per share at least 50,000 yen. Id. at art. 293-3(3).
" Prior to the Amendment, shareholders could make proposals concerning motions at
the meeting, but could not submit agenda items. BALLON, TOMITA, & Us Au, supra note 2, at
316. Art. 232-2 is entirely new.
33 Law No. 74, supra note 1, at art. 232-2(1).
34 Id. at art. 232-2(2).
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holder could only propose to a director that a meeting be held and sug-
gest an agenda for the meeting. If denied this meeting, the shareholder
had little recourse.35
Calculation of the requisite 300 shares is somewhat cumbersome. For
new companies organized after October 1, 1982, the 300 share require-
ment simply means 300 unit shares.3 6 For established companies, how-
ever, the Amendment apparently provides a strong motive for them to
consolidate their stock to reflect a 50,000 yen minimum per share net as-
set and, therefore, to allow only those who hold 300 unit shares or more
the right to make agenda proposals.3 7 Otherwise, based on pre-amend-
ment valuation, a shareholder holding only 300 shares with an initial
purchase of only 500 yen per share would be entitled to this proposal
right.3 8
The other primary changes in these Code sections relate to conduct
of the general meeting (teiji kabunushi sukai). The shareholders now
have the right to request that the directors and auditors explain matters
directly related to the conduct of the meeting.3 9 While this may seem in-
significant, it must be realized that in the past it was almost unheard of
for a shareholder to question or call for discussion concerning manage-
ment activities. However, the chairman has a corrollary right to ask any
person who is disturbing the meeting to leave.4" These measures, together
with the previously mentioned limitation on voting rights of a corporate
shareholder which is itself more than 25 percent owned by the company
conducting the meeting,41 should create a much more favorable atmo-
sphere for democratic discussion at general shareholders' meetings.
IV. DIRECTORS, BOARD MEETINGS AND INSIDE AUDITORS
A. Qualification and Conduct of Directors
The pre-amendment Code contained no express limitations on direc-
tor (torishimariyaku) qualifications.42 The new Code, however, provides
35Former Art. 237 has not been changed, and consequently the only way for such a
meeting to have been held, in the absence of the new Art. 232-2, was for the Court to have
ordered that a meeting be held, an occurrence virtually unheard of in Japan.
" Law No. 74, supra note 1, at art. 21. (Supp. Provisions, 1981).
'v Id. at art. 293-3(3); art. 15 (Supp. Provisions 1981).
Id. at art. 232-20(2). As under American corporation law, the shareholder is not pro-
vided with a license to propose anything whatsoever, but is confined to matters which are
within the ambit of the articles of incorporation and which can be resolved at the general
meeting.
:9 Id. at art. 237.3.
0o Id. at art. 237-4(3).
41 Id at art. 241(3).
42 Art. 254-2 is entirely new. Previously there were Penal Code provisions which related
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that several categories of persons are now disqualified, including persons
who have been declared bankrupt and those who have been convicted and
imprisoned for violations of the Commercial Code or any other law.4'
New limitations on competitive dealings and broader bases for poten-
tial liability have also significantly increased the individual director's
level of responsibility. Under the new Code, a director must obtain the
approval of the whole Board of Directors before entering into transac-
tions which are potentially competitive with the company's business.44
Even where this approval is given, the director must thereafter report the
material facts concerning the transaction to the board.4 5 Moreover, not
only will the individual director who conducts competitive business be
liable to the corporation for any damages resulting, but each director who
assented in the resolution to approve the competitive dealings is jointly
and severally liable. 46 The new Code creates the presumption that the
amount of the director's profit is the measure of damages to the
company.4
7
Directors can be removed at any time by resolution at a general
shareholders' meeting, except where they are serving for a set term, in
which case "just cause" is required.4 8
B. Board of Directors Meetings
Previously, the directors by resolution customarily appointed one of
their members as representative director (daihyo torishimariyaku), who
was then designated as the one who could call board meetings.49 While
this procedure undoubtedly streamlined things in many instances, the
designated director was then the only one who could convene board meet-
ings.50 Under the new Code, the other directors retain the right to call
board meetings even when a particular director has been designated.5 1
The procedure allows for the director making the demand to convene the
meeting if, after demand, the designated director sends no notice calling
to disqualification and non-qualification to assume management positions, but opinion was
divided as to their application to directors, who are not always considered company manage-
ment personnel. Journal of the Sangyo Horei Center, supra note 21, at 318.
41 Law No. 74, supra note 1, at art. 254-2. The Penal Provisions for Commercial Code
violations are set forth in Book II, Chapter VII thereof.
4 Id. at arts. 264(1), 265.
45 Id at art. 264(2).
48 Id at art. 266.
"I Id at art. 266(4).
48 Id. at art. 257.
49 Id. at art. 261.
50 Id.
61 Id. at art. 259(1), (2).
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the meeting.52 In any event, after the amendment, board meetings must
now be held at least once every three months.
53
As mentioned, the representative director typically wielded broad
powers in the conduct of the company's business. While not expressly
limiting the representative director's powers, the new Code does specify
several functions which must be performed by the whole board. These
include the disposal or acquisition of substantial assets, the incurring of
substantial obligations, the appointment of key employees and the estab-
lishment of branches or divisions of the company."
Finally, regarding board meetings, the minutes must now be main-
tained for 10 years, and must contain the substance of the proceedings
and record the attendance of directors and auditors. Shareholders are en-
titled to review these minutes and can obtain a court order if necessary to
do so.
5 5
V. PROVISIONS CONCERNING REPORTING AND ACCOUNTING TO
SHAREHOLDERS
A. Inside Auditors "Kansayaku"
Japanese corporations have been required to have at least one person
entitled kansayaku, which is commonly translated as an inside, or statu-
tory, auditor.56 The inside auditor must be distinguished from indepen-
dent certified public accountants (kunin kaikei-shi), since the inside au-
ditor is normally appointed on the basis of friendship or loyalty, and is
not a professional accountant. Under pre-amendment procedure, 57 the
role and function of the statutory auditor was in many cases merely to
review and certify that certain documents, e.g., balance sheets, business
reports, etc. were formally correct. Under the new Code, the inside audi-
tor in many respects is placed on the same level of responsibility and
accountability as a director.
The same restrictions as to who may serve as director are applicable
to inside auditors.5 8 In terms of powers and duties, the new Code empow-
ers the inside auditor to attend board meetings and report potential vio-
:2 Id. at art. 259(3).
3 Id. at art. 260(3).
54 Id. at art. 260(2).
55 Id. at art. 260-4.
" The Amendment now requires that large corporations capitalized at over 500 million
yen also must retain an accounting auditor "kaikei kansanin" who must be a certified pub-
lic accountant. Law for special exceptions to the Commercial Code concerning auditing, etc.,
of stock corporations, Law. No. 22 of 1974, ch. 11, art. II.
57 BALLON, TOmITA, & USAw, supra note 2, at 28, 146-49.
53 Law No. 74, supra note 1, at art. 280.
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lations by a director of the law or of the articles of incorporation. 9 The
inside auditor now may even request that a board meeting be convened,60
and may also request that a director or any other employee prepare a
report concerning business operations."
While the powers of the inside auditor are somewhat enlarged, so are
the liabilities. The pre-amendment liability of inside auditors to share-
holders or other third parties was unclear, but that uncertainty no longer
remains. An auditor who makes false statements in reporting, either in-
tentionally or from gross negligence, is liable to the same extent as a
director.6
2
B. Accounting Requirements
1. Documents Required
Under the new Code, there are a number of far-reaching changes in
both the methods used in producing the various accounting documents
and the prescribed contents of these documents. The result is that com-
panies now must fundamentally alter their method of accounting and
characterization of funds and that dividends must be paid against a sig-
nificantly greater portion of assets than was the case prior to the Code's
amendment.
In March of 1982, issued prior to the effective date of the amend-
ment in order to give sufficient lead time to corporate accounting depart-
ments, the Ministry of Justice provided detailed instructions as to the
contents of the mandatory reports, as well as the "detailed accompanying
statement."6 3 First, the new Code requires that financial reporting sub-
mitted or made available to shareholders be standardized. Prior to the
amendments, the information reported and forms presented by various
companies to shareholders lacked consistency. The new Code requires a
balance sheet (taishaku taishnhyu), a profit and loss statement (soneki
5 Id. at art. 260-3(2).
6o Id. at art. 260-3(3).
61 Id. at art. 274.
62 Id. at arts. 280(2); 266-3(3).
1 KABUSHIKI KAISHA NO TAISHAKU TAISHHYU, SoNSKI KEISANSHO, EIGYO HOKOKUSHO
OYOBi FUZOKU MEISAISHO NI KANSURU KISoKU (Regulations Concerning Corporate Balance
Sheet, Profit-Loss Statement, Business Report and Detailed Attachments Thereto), Mar.
31, 1982. The Regulations provide nine mandatory items for the business report, including:
capital investment, description of business plants or branches, parent-subsidiary relation-
ship, business results over the past three years, names of directors, auditors, and the seven
major shareholders, and amounts of debts and to whom owed. As for the contents of the
"detailed attachments" to the other three reports, they must contain 16 items, including:
fluctuations in relationship with subsidiaries, number of its own share acquired, transactions
with directors, auditors and controlling shareholders, amount of reserves, disclosure of liens
on assets, fluctuations in long term debt and/or paid in capital. Id.
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keisansho), a business report (eigyu hukokusho), and a proposal concern-
ing disposition of profits or allocation of losses, all of which are to be
submitted along with a detailed accompanying statement." Furthermore,
the Code now requires that such documents, which are to be prepared by
a director, be approved by the full board as well as audited by the inside
auditor65 prior to being submitted for consideration and approval at the
general shareholders' meeting.66
With these requirements established, the right of the shareholders to
obtain much more extensive and objective information is codified. While
these new provisions are open to some procedural questions,6 7 it is clearly
the intention of the Japanese Diet (Parliament) that shareholders and
creditors be provided with more thorough and verified information con-
cerning corporate finances.
2. Accounting Method
The most profound changes in the Code sections dealing with ac-
counting methods relate to the allocation of the issue price of each share
of stock between the paid-in capital and capital surplus accounts. s While
these changes are more prospective than immediate in nature because
they apply only to new issues of stock, the eventual result will be an in-
crease in the portion of profits out of which dividends must be paid, pre-
sumably in order to improve the low dividends historically paid by Japa-
nese companies.
Prior to the amendments, when issuing new shares the Code required
only that the amount equal to par value be credited to the stated capital
account; any excess could be credited to capital reserves (jumbi-kin).s9
What this typically has meant is that where the par value is 50 yen, but
the issue price several thousand yen, only the 50 yen was credited to
4 Law No. 74, supra note 1, at art. 281(1).
A' Id. at art. 281(1), (2).
Id. at art. 283(1). An exception is the business report. It need not be specifically
approved by, but merely reported to, the shareholders. But see supra note 63, for the de-
tailed requirements as to its contents.
67 For example, while both the accounting documents and detailed attachments must
be approved by both the Board and the Auditors, id. at art. 281(1), (2), it is not expressly
clear which must occur first. It would seem that the Board should approve such documents
prior to the Auditors, but since there is no penalty for post-audit approval there would
appear to be no prohibition against doing so, and in fact this is what many companies are
doing.
" Id. at arts. 281-95.
6, Id at art. 284 (pre-Amendment). With no-par stock, up to one quarter of the issue
price could previously be diverted from stated capital; however, since most shares have been
par value, this distinction has not been of great importance.
1983
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
stated capital."' Since Japanese corporations traditionally have used
stated capital and not current earnings as the main base on which divi-
dends are figured,7 1 this artificially low amount of stated capital has con-
tributed to the notoriously low dividend amounts paid by Japanese
corporations.
The amendments now require in principle that the total amount of
the issue price, whether of par value or not, should be credited to stated
capital.7 2 However, the amendments also allow the board to credit only
the amount of the issue price in excess of par value (or with no-par
shares, 50,000 yen) to capital reserve, as long as this amount does not
exceed one-half of the total issue price."3 For instance, where the market
price of newly issued value 500 yen shares is 5000 yen per share (note
that 10 such shares would be the minimum purchase allowed), only up to
2500 yen of the 4500 yen excess of purchase price over par value may now
be credited to reserves.
The foregoing changes, contained in the accounting sections of the
Code establishing limitations on the amounts that can be credited to cap-
ital reserves, not only should make a greater portion of the profits availa-
ble for distribution as cash dividends, but they also simplify the proce-
dure for voting stock dividends. The Code formerly required that in order
to declare a stock dividend a special resolution be passed by two-thirds
vote at the general shareholders' meeting.74 Now, merely an ordinary res-
olution by simple majority vote can determine stock dividends. 75
VI. OTHER NEW PROVISIONS
A. Bonds with Warrants Now Permitted
Corporate planners have desired that companies be entitled to issue,
along with standard and convertible bonds, some form of bond giving pre-
emptive rights to the bondholders to purchase stock" (i.e., bonds with
preemptive rights which would allow the purchaser to hold both stock
and bonds simultaneously) and to exercise the stock purchase rights sepa-
rately from the rights as bondholder. This type of instrument would pro-
vide a method, attractive from the investor's position, for the company to
raise additional funds (presumably many investors would like simultane-
70 Since the mid-1970's, companies have usually set the issue price of new shares at the
prevailing market price rather than at par value.
71 See BALLON, ToMrrA, & UsAMI, supra note 2, at 116-19.
72 Law No. 74, supra note 1, at art. 284-2(1).
71 Id. at art. 284-2(2).
74 Former Art. 293-2 required that a two-thirds vote (pursuant to Art. 343, which is
unchanged) be obtained in order to declare a stock dividend.
7' Law No. 74, supra note 1, at arts. 239, 293-2.
78 Journal of the Sangyo Horei Center, supra note 21, at 332.
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ously to enjoy the rights of both bondholder and stockholder). It is also
advantageous from the company's position since, for example, it could be
issued at a somewhat lower interest rate than ordinary bonds and could
be used as one means of hedging against foreign exchange risks incurred
due to the growing amount of foreign currency claims many companies
are now holding.
The new Code accordingly provides for the issuance of debentures
giving preemptive rights to subscribe to new shares (shinkabu hiki-
ukekentsuki shasai),7 along with retaining the provisions relating to con-
vertible bonds.78 The debentures with preemptive rights can be either
with detachable or fixed warrants. Where the warrant (representing the
preemptive stock purchase rights) is detachable, it can be negotiated sep-
arately from the board. When the purchase rights evidenced by the de-
tachable warrant have been exercised, the bond remains outstanding until
redeemed by the company.
B. Further Restrictions on Sukaiya
As previously discussed, the 50,000 yen minimum transaction of
share purchase is aimed, in part, at curbing the activities of sykaiya.79
There is an additional provision, as well, in the new Code aimed at
siakaiya activities, which expressly prohibits the granting of "gratuitious"
offers of "material benefits" to anyone in exchange for exercise of share-
holder's rights. 0 There are some gaps in the new Code provisions though.
For example, it is not expressly clear that the "gratuitious benefits" are
prohibited to be offered to persons not presently shareholders (although
clearly the law is so intended). Neither does a prohibition against individ-
ual directors offering such "benefits" exist, but only against the company
doing so.
Nonetheless, the significance of this Code section is that it is in-
cluded in the new Code. Violations of the provision are punishable by
imprisonment and/or fines, and directors and auditors are jointly liable.
While no one is claiming the complete elimination of the sukaiya as a
result, it is certain to have at least some impact on their future
activities."1
7 Law No. 74, supra note 1, at art. 341-8 through 341-15.
78 Id. at art. 341-2 through 341-7.
79 Supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
'0 Law No. 74, supra note 1, at art. 294-2.
81 A newly created task force of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department arrested
140 persons during the October 1 through November 1, 1982 period, on charges of extortion
related to sokaiya activities now made illegal. Mainichi Shinbun, Nov. 3, 1982, at 4, col. 2.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Amended Commercial Code must be viewed as instituting
sweeping changes in the conduct of Japanese corporations' activities. For
instance, simply with respect to the newly imposed limitation on alloca-
tion to capital reserves, it is estimated that of the 1.4 trillion yen ($5.6
billion) allocated to capital reserves by companies during the 1980 year,
approximately 1 trillion yen ($4 billion) would have been affected if the
new limitations had at the time been in force. 2 Thus, the changes have
had, and will continue to have, a profound impact upon corporate ac-
counting departments and certified public accountants.
The changes concerning shareholder rights are no less significant.
While the new Code does not, for instance, go so far as requiring cumula-
tive voting, as do many corporation codes, the amendments must be ex-
amined in context. It remains to be determined whether, as expected and
hoped, there will actually be an upsurge in the amount of domestic and
foreign investors in over-the-counter purchases. If an increase in such
purchases does not occur, however, it cannot be blamed on the drafters of
the modernized Amended Commercial Code.
82 Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Oct. 22, 1982, at 11, coL 2.
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